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Medieval reflection within Judaism about morality and religion has, asits most significant figure, Maimonides (d. 1204) who was born inMuslim Spain, and was familiar with much of the Muslim discussion ofthese questions. The Guide of the Perplexed was written foryoung men who had read Aristotle and were worried about the tensionbetween the views of the philosopher and their faith. Maimonidesteaches that we do indeed have some access just as human beings to therightness and wrongness of acts; but what renders conforming to thesestandards obligatory is that God reveals them in specialrevelation. The laws are obligatory whether we understand the reasonsfor them or not, but sometimes we do see how it is beneficial to obey,and Maimonides is remarkably fertile in providing such reasons.
List of moral values and beliefs Term paper Help
A fifth sort of argument concludes that defining art isphilosophically unnecessary, on the grounds that the problemof defining art reduces to a pair of easier sorts of problems: theproblem of giving an account of each individual artform, and theproblem of defining what it is to be an artform. That is, givendefinitions of the individual artforms, and a definition of what it isto be an artform, and given, crucially, that every artwork belongs tosome artform, a definition of art falls out: x is a workof art if and only if x is a work inactivity P, and P is one of the artforms (Lopes2008). Every artwork belongs to an artform, on this view, becauseevery artwork either belongs to an existing artwork or else pioneers anew artform. The key claim that every work of art belonging to noextant artform pioneers a new one may be defended on the grounds thatany reason to say that a work belonging to no extant artform is anartwork is a reason to say that it pioneers a new artform. Inresponse, it is noted that an activity might be ruled out as anartform on the grounds that no artworks belong to it, and that thequestion of whether or not a thing belongs to an artform arises onlybecause there is a prior reason for thinking that the thing is anartwork. So determining whether a practice is an artform requiresdetermining that its elements are artworks. Art, therefore, seemsconceptually prior to artforms. An account of thecomplex analysandum artform seems to require an analysis ofeach component—an analysis of what it is to bean artform no less than an analysis of what it is to be anartform (Adajian 2012).
It must be weird to completely and totally miss the very simple fact that the obsession with sex and sexual issues has come from the secular left for almost 50 years. And it is not enough for these totalitarian thugs to accept the simple fact that Christians don’t give a fig what they do with their bodies, they have to force their view of sexuality down our throats at every opportunity, and then use the power of the courts and governments to shut up those who disagree with them. And then when we seek to defend ourselves from the onslaught and affirm the wisdom of traditional sexual morality, we are mocked. Yes, Chuck, you are most unhelpful, which is a very diplomatic way of putting something that could be said with much more vigor.
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One recent development in analytic ethical theory has been a revivalof divine command theory parallel to the revival of natural law theorythat I have already described. A pioneer in this revival was PhilipQuinn's Divine Command and Moral Requirements (1978). Hedefended the theory against the usual objections (one, deriving fromPlato's Euthyprho, that it makes morality arbitrary, and thesecond, deriving from a misunderstanding of Kant, that it isinconsistent with human autonomy), and proposed that we understand therelation between God and moral rightness causally, rather thananalyzing the terms of moral obligation as meaning‘commanded by God’. Though we could stipulate such adefinition, it would make it obscure how theists and non-theists couldhave genuine moral discussion, as they certainly seem to do. RobertM. Adams, in a series of articles and then in Finite and InfiniteGoods (1999), first separates off the good (which he analyzesPlatonically in terms of imitating the ultimate good, which is God)and the right. He then defends a divine command theory of the right byarguing that obligation is always obligation to someone, andGod is the most appropriate person, given human limitations. JohnHare, InGod and Morality (2007) and Divine Command (2015),defends a version of the theory that derives from God's sovereigntyand defends the theory against the objection that obedience to divinecommand itself requires justification. He also compares Christian,Jewish and Muslim accounts of divine command. Thomas L. Carson'sValue and the Good Life (2000) argues that normative theoryneeds to be based on an account of rationality, and then proposes thata divine-preference account of rationality is superior to all theavailable alternatives. An objection to divine command theory ismounted by Mark Murphy's An Essay on Divine Authority (2002)and God and Moral Law (2012) on the grounds that divinecommand only has authority over those persons that have submittedthemselves to divine authority, but moral obligation has authoritymore broadly. William Wainwright's Religion and Moralitydefends the claim that divine command theory provides a moreconvincing account of moral obligation than any virtue-based theory,including Zagzebski's divine motivation theory, discussedearlier. Finally, C. Stephen Evans, in Kierkegaard's Ethics ofLove: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (2004) andGod and Moral Obligation(2013) articulates both inKierkegaard and in its own right a divine command theory that isargued to be superior to all the main alternative non-theist accountsof the nature and basis of moral obligation.
Kantianism dictionary definition | Kantianism defined
The section of this entry on the continental school discussed brieflythe topic of postmodernism. Within analytic philosophy the term isless prevalent. But both schools live in the same increasingly globalcultural context. In this context we can reflect on the two maindisqualifiers of the project of relating morality intimately toreligion that seemed to emerge in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies. The first disqualifier was the prestige of natural science,and the attempt to make it foundational for all human knowledge. Thevarious empiricist, verificationist, and reductionist forms offoundationalism have not yet succeeded, and even within modernphilosophy there has been a continuous resistance to them. This is notto say they will not succeed in the future (for example we maydiscover a foundation for ethics in the theory of evolution), but theconfidence in their future success has waned. Moreover, thesecularization hypothesis seems to have been false, as mentionedearlier. Certainly parts of Western Europe are less attached totraditional institutional forms of religion. But taking the world as awhole, religion seems to be increasing in influence rather thandeclining as the world's educational standards improve. The secondmain disqualifier was the liberal idea (present in the narrative ofthis entry from the time of the religious wars in Europe) that we needa moral discourse based on reason and not religion in order to avoidthe hatred and bloodshed that religion seems to bring with it. Herethe response to Rawls has been telling. It seems false that we canrespect persons and at the same time tell them to leave theirfundamental commitments behind in public discourse, and it seems falsealso that some purely rational but still action-guiding component canbe separated off from these competing substantive conceptions of thegood (see Wolterstorff, “An Engagement with Rorty”.) It istrue that religious commitment can produce the deliberate targeting ofcivilians in a skyscraper. But the history of the twentieth centurysuggests that non-religious totalitarian regimes have at least as muchblood on their hands. Perhaps the truth is, as Kant saw, that peopleunder the Evil Maxim will use any available ideology for theirpurposes. Progress towards civility is more likely if Muslims,Christians, Jews, (and Buddhists and Hindus) are encouraged to enter‘the public square’ with their commitmentsexplicit, and see how much common ethical ground there in factis. This writer has done some of this discussion, and found the commonground surprisingly extensive, though sometime common languagedisguises significant differences. Progress seems more likely in thisway than by trying to construct a neutral philosophical ground thatvery few people actually accept.