become a necessity, then it is not a skill proceeding from
How do one realize these powers fully? Not by becoming adept at everykind of activity in which deliberating and judging on the basis ofreason is called for. For then one would have to master every kind ofcultural, scientific, and philosophical activity. Rather, Aristotle’sidea is that an individual develops these abilities to the extent thathe enjoys and values the exercise of his realized rational powers in awide variety of different and even seemingly unconnectedactivities. When that happens, his exercise of these abilities is acontinuing source of self-esteem and enjoyment. He comes to like hislife and himself and is now a genuine self-lover. In NicomacheanEthics IX.8, Aristotle takes pains to distinguish true self-love,which characterizes the virtuous person, from vulgar self-love, whichcharacterizes morally defective types. Morally defective types lovethemselves in the sense that they love material goods andadvantages. They desire to secure these things even at the expense ofother people, and so they act in ways that are morallyvicious. Genuine self-lovers, on the other hand, love most theexercise of their developed human activity, which is rationalactivity. When they enjoy and recognize the value of developing theirrational powers, they can use this recognition to guide theirdecisions and to determine which actions are appropriate in whichcircumstances. This is the reasoning of those who have practicalwisdom (phronêsis). Moreover, because they now takepleasure in the right things (they enjoy most figuring things outrather than the accumulation of wealth or power), they will avoid manyof the actions, and will be unattracted to many of the pleasures,associated with the common vices. In other words, they will act as avirtuous person would.
freedom and accordingly not a moral skill (66).
"In America there existed, until very recently, a set ofconditions which perhaps made the solution to Hardin's subsetpossible; we lived with the myth that we were 'one people,indivisible. . . .' This myth postulated that we were the great'melting pot' of the world wherein the diverse cultural ores ofEurope were poured into the crucible of the frontier experienceto produce a new alloy -- an American civilization. This newcivilization was presumably united by a common value system thatwas democratic, equalitarian, and existing under universallyenforceable rules contained in the Constitution and the Bill ofRights.
(3) that the administrative system, supported by the criterionof judgment and access to coercion, can and will protect thecommons from further desecration." [p. 55]
Includes "Industry under Socialism," by Annie Besant.
"There is also an increasing recognition amongcontemporary social scientists that there is a subset ofproblems, such as population, atomic war, environmentalcorruption, and the recovery of a livable urban environment, forwhich there are no current political solutions. The thesis ofthis article is that the common area shared by these two subsetscontains most of the critical problems that threaten the veryexistence of contemporary man." [p. 53]
Yeager" class="author" title="bio"BIO
Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. Itneeds to be made precise — i.e., its open variables need to befilled out. The formal postulate remains quite empty as long as itremains unclear when or through what features two or more persons orcases should be considered equal. All debates over the properconception of justice, i.e., over who is due what, can be understoodas controversies over the question of which cases are equal and whichunequal (Aristotle, Politics, 1282b 22). For this reasonequality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim thatpersons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told— what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Actually, every normative theory implies acertain notion of equality. In order to outline their position,egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian)conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantiveprinciples of equality, discussed below.
This has been translated into Polish here:
"There has developed in the contemporary natural sciencesa recognition that there is a subset of problems, such aspopulation, atomic war, and environmental corruption, for whichthere are no technical solutions.
Introduction by Albert Jay Nock is not available online.
According to Aristotle, the full realization of our rational powers isnot something we can achieve or maintain on our own. It is hard, hesays in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, for a solitary person to becontinuously active, but it is easier with others. To realize ourpowers fully we need at least a group of companions who share ourinterests and with whom we can cooperate to achieve our mutuallyrecognized goals. In this kind of cooperative activity, we are partsof a larger enterprise, so that when others act, it is as though weare acting, too. In this way, these activities expand our conceptionof who “we” are, and they make the use of our powers more continuousand more stable. Examples listed by Aristotle include sailors on aship, soldiers on an expedition, members of families, businessrelationships, religious associations, citizens of a politicalcommunity, and colleagues engaged in contemplative activity. AsAristotle explains in Rhetoric II.4, if we and ourcooperative partners do their parts responsibly, each will developfeelings of friendship for the others involved. In this way,successful cooperative activity transforms persons’ desires andmotivations. Although we may have initiated activity forself-interested reasons, the psychological result is that we come tolike our cooperative partners and to develop a concern for their goodfor their own sakes. This change, Aristotle indicates, is caused tooccur in us. It is not chosen. Once bonds of friendship are formed,it is natural for us to exhibit the social virtues Aristotle describesin Nicomachean Ethics IV.6–8, which include generosity,friendliness, and mildness of temper.