The world he created reflects that perfection.

In his self-sacrifice Jesus has made available the gift of righteousness.
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All suffering is therefore a consequence of this abuse of free will.

The second, which can be labeled the indirect inductiveapproach, argues instead that theism can be shown to be unlikely to betrue by establishing that there is some alternativehypothesis—other than the mere negation of theism—that islogically incompatible with theism, and more probable thantheism. This approach, which was originally used by David Hume in oneof his arguments in his Dialogues Concerning NaturalReligion, and which has been set out and defended in a detailedway by Paul Draper, can be viewed as involving an inference to thebest explanation, a type of inductive inference that was discovered byC. S. Pierce, and which is now very widely accepted.

Augustine uses the analogy of blindness – blindness is not an entity but the absence of sight.
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This includes natural evil as well as moral evil.

So far, this is simply a matter of probability theory. But now Draperintroduces two substantive claims. The first is that the a prioriprobability of the hypothesis of indifference is not less than the apriori probability of theism, so that we have

For Augustine, evil came about as a direct result of the misuse of free will.
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One way of supporting the latter claim is by introducing the idea oflogical probability, where logical probability is a measure of theextent to which one proposition supports another (Carnap, 1962,19–51, esp. 43–7), and then arguing (Tooley, 1977,690–3, and 1987, 129–37) that when one is dealing with anaccidental generalization, the probability that theregularity in question will obtain gets closer and closer to zero,without limit, as the number of potential instances gets larger andlarger, and that this is so regardless of how large one’sevidence base is. Is it impossible, then, to justify universalgeneralizations? The answer is that if laws are more than mereregularities—and, in particular, if they are second-orderrelations between universals—then the obtaining of a law, andthus of the corresponding regularity, may have a very high probabilityupon even quite a small body of evidence. So universal generalizationscan be justified, if they obtain in virtue of underlying, governinglaws of nature.

Natural evil has come about through an imbalance in nature brought about by the Fall.
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Therefore, from (1), (2), and (3):

That Plantinga initially focused upon abstract formulations of theargument from evil was not, perhaps, surprising, given that a numberof writers—including Mackie, H. J. McCloskey (1960), andH. D. Aiken (1957–58)—had defended incompatibility versions ofthe argument from evil, and it is natural to formulate such argumentsin an abstract way, since although one may wish to distinguish, forexample, between natural evils and moral evils, reference to concretecases of evil would not seem to add anything. But once one shifts toprobabilistic formulations of the argument from evil, the situation isvery different: details about concrete cases of evil may beevidentially crucial.

Rowe’s response is then as follows:

Given that the preceding observations are rather obvious ones, onemight have expected that discussions of the argument from evil wouldhave centered mainly upon concrete formulations of theargument. Rather surprisingly, that has not been so. Indeed, someauthors seem to focus almost exclusively upon very abstract versionsof the argument.

Similarly, by interchanging ‘HI’ and ‘T’, we also have:

Plantinga’s view here, however, is very implausible. For not only canthe argument from evil be formulated in terms of specific evils, butthat is the natural way to do so, given that it is only certain typesof evils that are generally viewed as raising a serious problem withrespect to the rationality of belief in God. To concentrateexclusively on abstract versions of the argument from evil istherefore to ignore the most plausible and challenging versions of theargument.

The Problem of Evil: Why Would a Good God Create Suffering?

Consider, now, the following formulation of the argument from evil,which, in contrast to the abstract version of the argument from evilset out in section 1.1, focuses on quite concrete types of evil: